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 Over the years, practical intelligence, social intelligence, and especially emotional 
intelligence have received substantial attention in both the academic and practitioner 
literatures. However, at the same time, these individual difference “constructs” have also 
fueled controversies and criticisms including their applications to employee selection. It is 
without doubt that their definition, dimensionality, and operationalization (measurement) 
have been much more questioned as compared to the more traditional or established 
constructs (i.e. cognitive ability, personality) in this section of the Handbook. 
 This chapter has two main objectives. The first objective is to review and clarify the 
conceptualization and measurement of these three constructs (or categories of constructs). In 
doing so, we aim to identify commonalities and differences among the three constructs. The 
second objective is to advance research on practical, social, and emotional intelligence. We 
aim to achieve both objectives by placing the three intelligence constructs in an integrative 
conceptual framework that relates them to traditional individual difference constructs and 
critical criterion constructs. We end by proposing directions for future research. 
Definitions and Conceptualizations 
 In this section, we review how practical, emotional, and social intelligence have been 
conceptualized and the research that attempted to empirically test these conceptualizations. 
Practical Intelligence 
 Sternberg and colleagues introduced the construct of practical intelligence in the mid- 
to late-1980s (Sternberg, 1988; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). As a common thread running 
through the various definitions of practical intelligence, it is generally considered to refer to 
the ability of an individual to deal with the problems and situations of everyday life 
(Bowman, Markham, & Roberts, 2001). In lay terms, it can be characterized as “intuition” or 
“common sense” and it is often referred to as “street smart” to contrast with “book smart” 
which is used to characterize traditional analytical or academic intelligence. 
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 A central element in practical intelligence is tacit knowledge. Sternberg, Wagner, 
Williams, and Horvath (1995) defined tacit knowledge as “action-orientated knowledge, 
acquired without direct help from others, that allows individuals to achieve goals they 
personally value (p. 916)”. This definition encompasses the key characteristics of tacit 
knowledge (see Hedlund et al., 2003). First, tacit knowledge is difficult to articulate because 
it is not formalized in explicit procedures and rules. Second, tacit knowledge is typically 
situationally specific procedural knowledge, telling people how to act in various situations. 
Third, individuals acquire tacit knowledge on the basis of their own everyday experience 
related to a specific domain. Thus, tacit knowledge is not formally taught; it is experience-
based. Fourth, tacit knowledge is practical as it enables individuals to obtain the goals that 
they value in life. These characteristics exemplify the claim of practical intelligence and tacit 
knowledge as being constructs that are conceptually distinct from academic intelligence, 
technical job knowledge, or personality.  
 Research by Sternberg and colleagues as well as by others has found some support for 
or at least produced findings consistent with some of these claims. First, tacit knowledge 
seems to increase with experience. For example, business managers received higher tacit 
knowledge scores than business graduate students who in turn outperformed undergraduate 
students, although sample sizes in these groups were often small (Wagner, 1987). Second, 
scores on tacit knowledge inventories showed low correlations (below .20) with measures of 
fluid and crystallized intelligence (Legree, Heffner, Psotka, Martin, & Medsker, 2003; Tan & 
Libby, 1997). Finally, Bowman et al. (2001) reviewed research on tacit knowledge in 
organizational, educational, and military settings and concluded that the assessment of tacit 
knowledge has certain promise for predicting performance in these real-world environments, 
although the level of prediction does not reach the values obtained with g (see also Van 
Rooy, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2006). Although most of these results were obtained 
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in educational, military, sales, or business contexts, Baum, Bird, and Singh (2011) also found 
evidence for the role of practical intelligence in the context of entrepreneurship: Practical 
intelligence interacted with growth goals to predict venture growth across four years. 
 Bowman et al. (2001) leveled various criticisms with respect to the construct of 
practical intelligence. From a conceptual point of view, questions have been raised whether 
practical intelligence (tacit knowledge) at all exists as a single construct that is different from 
other types of intelligence, job knowledge, and personality (see also Gottfredson, 2003; 
McDaniel & Whetzel, 2005). In particular, McDaniel and Whetzel (2005) put various claims 
related to practical intelligence (tacit knowledge) to the test. To this end, they used research 
related to situational judgment tests (SJTs), a measurement method that is closely related to 
tacit knowledge inventories (see below). Consistent with research by Sternberg and 
colleagues, McDaniel and Whetzel concluded that such tests predict job performance and 
have incremental validity over more common selection procedures. However, they argued 
that there was no support for the other claims. Specifically, they cited studies showing that 
SJTs of practical intelligence were factorial complex and could not be represented by a 
general factor in factor analytic studies. They also reviewed research showing that these test 
scores were significantly related to scores on established constructs such as g, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and agreeableness. Later in this chapter, we argue that 
such criticisms are both right and wrong – they are right that practical intelligence is not a 
unitary construct, but they are wrong to conclude that the factorially complex results and 
significant correlations with established constructs imply that practical intelligence is not a 
distinct and valid construct. 
Emotional intelligence 
 Since the mid-nineties, emotional intelligence (EI) is probably the psychological 
construct that has received the greatest attention in both popular and academic literatures. 
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Historically, a distinction is made between two conceptualizations of emotional intelligence, 
namely an ability emotional intelligence model and a trait emotional intelligence model (e.g., 
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007). 
The first model conceptualizes emotional intelligence as an ability akin to cognitive 
ability and measures it via performance-based tests. In this paradigm, emotional intelligence 
is viewed as another legitimate type of intelligence. Hence, this model is also referred to as 
emotional cognitive ability or information processing emotional intelligence. Emotional 
intelligence is then defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to 
discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one’s thinking and actions” 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 189). This definition shows that the higher order construct of 
emotional intelligence is broken down into four branches. The first branch, emotional 
identification, perception and expression, deals with the ability to accurately perceive 
emotions in others’ verbal and nonverbal behavior. Emotional facilitation of thought is the 
second branch, referring to the ability to use emotions to assist thinking and problem-solving. 
Third, emotional understanding denotes the ability to analyze feelings, discriminate among 
emotions, and think about their outcomes. Finally, emotional management deals with abilities 
related to maintaining or changing emotions. We refer to Côte (2014) for an excellent and 
detailed overview of the different abilities under each branch. 
 The second model, the trait EI model, views EI as akin to personality and assesses it 
via self-report. In this model, emotional intelligence is defined as “an array of non-cognitive 
capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with 
environmental demands and pressures” (Bar-On, 1997, p. 16). As the name suggests, this 
model uses a broad definition of emotional intelligence. Abilities such as emotion perception 
are typically combined with non-cognitive competencies, skills, and personality traits. For 
example, one of the most popular mixed models (Bar-On, 1997) measures five broad factors 
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and fifteen facets: (1) Intrapersonal (Self-Regard, Emotional Self Awareness, Assertiveness, 
Independence, and Self-Actualization), (2) Interpersonal (Empathy, Social Responsibility, 
Interpersonal Relationship), (3) Stress Management (Stress Tolerance and Impulse Control), 
(4) Adaptability (Reality Testing, Flexibility, and Problem Solving), and (5) General Mood 
(Optimism and Happiness). In the Goleman (1995) model, a similar expanded definition of 
emotional intelligence is used, referring to emotional intelligence as a set of learned 
competencies. Emotional intelligence competence is then defined as “an ability to recognize, 
understand, and use emotional information about oneself or others that leads to or causes 
effective or superior performance (Boyatzis & Sala, 2004, p. 149). A distinction is further 
made between five main competency clusters (with various subcompetencies): self-
awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills. Given the trait-like nature 
of the mixed model, some researchers have suggested using terms such as “trait emotional 
intelligence”, “emotional self-efficacy” (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) or “emotional self-
confidence” (Roberts, Schulze, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2005). 
 Meta-analytic research (Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005) demonstrated that 
these two models are not measuring the same constructs. Measures based on the two models 
correlated only .14 with one another. In addition, these two models had different correlates. 
Emotional intelligence measures based on the mixed model overlapped considerably with 
personality trait scores but not with cognitive ability. Conversely, emotional intelligence 
measures developed according to an emotional intelligence ability model correlated more 
with cognitive ability and less with personality. Other research has clarified that ability model 
measures correlate especially with verbal (crystallized) ability, with correlations typically 
between .30 and .40 (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). Hence, some have posited that the 
term “emotional intelligence” should be replaced by the term “emotional knowledge” 
(Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2004). 
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 Besides the construct-related validity of emotional intelligence, its criterion-related 
validity has also been scrutinized. To this end, Côte (2014) reviewed three meta-analyses: 
Joseph and Newman (2010) found an uncorrected correlation of .16 between emotional 
intelligence (ability model) and job performance, whereas in O’Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, 
Hawver, and Story (2011) this uncorrected correlation was .21. Finally, an earlier meta-
analysis of Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) that used both emotional intelligence models 
revealed a correlation of .17 for predicting performance in a variety of settings (e.g., 
employment, academic). 
 There are especially conceptual and methodological problems associated with the 
mixed model of emotional intelligence (Mayer et al., 2008). First, the ambiguous (all 
encompassing) definition and the very broad content of the mixed model have been criticized 
(e.g., Landy, 2005; Locke, 2005; Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004). For example, Landy 
(2005) succinctly noted: “the construct [of emotional intelligence] and the operational 
definitions of the construct (i.e., the actual measurement instruments) are moving targets (p. 
419). Similarly, Locke (2005) posited that “the concept of EI has now become so broad and 
the components so variegated that no one concept could possible encompass or integrate all 
of them, no matter what the concept was called; it is no longer even an intelligible concept” 
(p. 426).  
 Another criticism relates to redundancy of the mixed model with Big Five personality 
traits. For instance, De Raad (2005) explored to what extent emotional intelligence (mixed 
model) can be expressed in terms of personality traits. To this end, he gathered a total of 437 
items from emotional intelligence inventories. Sixty-six percent of the emotional intelligence 
descriptors could be classified in a well-known Big Five framework (The Abridged Big Five-
Dimensional Circumplex). The lion share of the terms was categorized under Agreeableness 
and Emotional Stability. The main reason for items not being classifiable was that they were 
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ambiguous, as they were often related to several Big Five factors. In other studies, the 
multiple correlation between Big Five scores and scores on mixed model emotional 
intelligence measures ranged between .75 and .79 (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Grubb & 
McDaniel, 2007). Other studies, however, found incremental validity of the mixed model 
over and above personality (Law, Wong, & Song, 2004; Tett, Fox, & Wang, 2005). 
Nonetheless, in the scientific community, there have been calls to give up the mixed model 
(despite its popularity in practice), to focus solely on the ability model (Daus & Ashkanasy, 
2005), or at least not to refer to the mixed model as emotional intelligence (Cherniss, 2010). 
In recent years, two meta-analyses have further clarified various aspects in this 
debate. First, Joseph and Newman (2010) examined the validity of emotional intelligence as 
conceptualized only in the ability model. They found support for a sequential relationship 
among emotional intelligence facets (emotion perception, understanding, and regulation) and 
job performance, with personality and cognitive ability as antecedents of these emotional 
intelligence processes. Second, Joseph, Jin, Newman, and O’Boyle (2015) examined the 
validity of emotional intelligence as conceptualized in the mixed model. Although Joseph et 
al. found a mean corrected correlation of .29 between mixed emotional intelligence and 
supervisor-rated job performance, this relationship became .00 after controlling for already-
established constructs such as ability EI, self-efficacy, personality, and cognitive ability. 
Taken together, these two meta-analyses demonstrate that further progress on emotional 
intelligence is to be made via more refined conceptualizations and measurement of the ability 
emotional intelligence model (see also our model below).   
 That said, the ability model is not without limitations either. For example, a large-
scale examination of many emotional intelligence, cognitive intelligence, and personality 
measures showed that emotion perception (as represented by measures of perception of 
emotions in faces and pictures) was the only branch of the four branches of the ability model 
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that could not be classified under established measures (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). 
But even the emotion perception construct has drawbacks as the construct does not seem to 
have generalizability across different measures (Gohm, 2004). That is, existing emotion 
perception measures correlate lowly among themselves (Roberts et al., 2006). 
 In comparing the findings from the ability and the trait models, a major 
methodological problem exists due to a method-construct confound resulting from the fact 
that the ability model is often measured using performance-based tests, whereas the trait 
model is often measured using self-reports. In order to advance research on the comparison of 
ability and trait models of emotional intelligence (and also on the comparison of these models 
when applied to practical intelligence or social intelligence), rigorous designs that allow us to 
clearly isolate construct and method variances are needed (Chan & Schmitt, 2005). 
Social Intelligence 
 Of the three intelligence constructs, social intelligence has the longest history. The 
idea goes back to Thorndike (1920) who defined social intelligence as “the ability to 
understand and manage men and women, boys and girls – to act wisely in human relations” 
(p. 228). As noted by Landy (2005), Thorndike did not build a theory of social intelligence, 
but he used the notion of social intelligence only to clarify that intelligence could manifest 
itself in different facets (e.g., abstract. mechanical, social). 
 Social intelligence has a checkered history. Early studies tried to distinguish social 
intelligence from academic intelligence (e.g., Hoepener & O’Sullivan, 1968; Keating, 1978). 
However, these research efforts were unsuccessful. The problem was that measures of social 
intelligence did not correlate highly among themselves and that academic intelligence and 
social intelligence formed one factor. Methodologically, it was troublesome that both 
intelligences were measured with the same method (paper-and-pencil measures). The early 
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research led to the conclusion that the “putative domain of social intelligence lacks empirical 
coherency, at least as it is represented by the measures used here” (Keating, 1978, p. 221). 
 Two advancements led to more optimism. The first was the distinction between 
cognitive social intelligence (e.g., social perception or the ability to understand or decode 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors of other persons) and behavioral social intelligence 
(effectiveness in social situations). Using this multidimensional definition of social 
intelligence and multiple measures (self, teacher, and peer ratings), Ford and Tisak (1983) 
were able to distinguish social intelligence from academic intelligence. In addition, social 
intelligence predicted social behavior better than academic intelligence (see also Marlowe, 
1986). The second advancement was the use of multitrait-multimethod designs (and 
confirmatory factor analysis) to obtain separate and unconfounded estimates of trait and 
method variance (Jones & Day, 1997; Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995). 
 These more sophisticated multitrait-multimethod designs have brought further 
evidence for the multidimensionality of social intelligence and for its discriminability vis-à-
vis academic intelligence. For example, the aforementioned distinction made between 
cognitive social intelligence and behavioral social intelligence has been confirmed (e.g., 
Wong et al., 1995). Similarly, a distinction is often made between fluid and crystallized social 
intelligence. The fluid form of social intelligence refers to social-cognitive flexibility (the 
ability to flexibly apply social knowledge in novel situations) or social inference. Conversely, 
a term such as social knowledge (knowledge of social etiquette, procedural and declarative 
social knowledge about social events) denotes the more crystallized component of social 
intelligence (Jones & Day, 1997). Despite these common findings, the dimensions, the 
definitions, and measures of social intelligence still vary a lot across studies. Along these 
lines, Weis and Süss (2005) provided an excellent overview of the different facets of social 
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intelligence that have been examined. This might form the basis for adopting a more uniform 
terminology in the description of social intelligence sub-dimensions. 
 Interest in social intelligence has also known a renaissance under the general term of 
social effectiveness constructs. According to Ferris, Perrewé, and Douglas (2002), social 
effectiveness is a “broad, higher-order, umbrella term, which groups a number of moderately-
related, yet conceptually-distinctive, manifestations of social understanding and competence” 
(p. 50). Examples are social competence, self-monitoring, emotional intelligence, social skill, 
social deftness, practical intelligence, etc. Especially, the value of social skills has been 
scrutinized. Similar to social intelligence, social skills are posited to have a cognitive 
component (interpersonal perceptiveness) and a behavioral component (behavioral flexibility, 
Riggio, 1986; Schneider, Ackerman, & Kanfer, 1996). Another interesting framework of 
social skills was proposed by Klein, DeRouin, and Salas (2006). They distinguished among 
ten social skills, which they more parsimoniously grouped under two meta social skills 
(communication and relationship building). 
 A key difference between social skills and personality traits is that the former are 
learned (i.e., an ability), whereas the latter are relatively stable. Research has found that they 
are only moderately (.20) correlated (Ferris, Witt, & Hochwarter, 2001). However, both 
constructs are also related in that social skills enable personality trait to show their effects 
(Ferris et al., 2001; Hogan & Shelton, 1998). Research has indeed confirmed that social skills 
moderate the effects of personality traits (conscientiousness) on job performance (Witt & 
Ferris, 2003). Social skills were also found to have direct effects on managerial job 
performance, although personality and cognitive ability were not controlled for in most 
studies (Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006).  
Conclusions 
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 Our review of practical, social, and emotional intelligence highlights that these three 
constructs share remarkable similarities. Specifically, we see at least three parallels. First, the 
origins and rationale behind each of the constructs can be summarized as “going beyond g”. 
Cognitively-oriented measures of ability and achievement have been traditionally used in 
employment and educational contexts. However, at the same time there has always been 
substantial interest in exploring possible supplemental (“alternative”) predictors for 
broadening the constructs measured and reducing possible adverse impact. Supplementing 
cognitive with alternative predictors is seen as a mechanism for accomplishing this (Sackett, 
Schmitt, Ellingson, & Kabin, 2001). Whereas social intelligence is the oldest construct, 
practical intelligence came into fashion at the end of the eighties. Since Goleman’s (1995) 
book, emotional intelligence is the newest fad. Every time, the construct was introduced as 
the panacea for the problem of an exclusive reliance on g. We agree that there is a need to go 
beyond g and identify new and non-g constructs, but a new construct has little scientific 
explanatory and utility value if it is defined solely by negation (i.e., as non-g). Hence, good 
construct-related validity evidence for the three constructs is needed. The current state of 
research indicates to us that such efforts have been undertaken for social and emotional 
intelligence (ability model). Still, more rigorous construct validation studies are needed. 
Second, the conceptualizations of these three constructs have salient parallels. Each of these 
three constructs has various definitions, is multidimensional, and there exists debate about 
their different dimensions. Third, for each of these constructs, investigations of incremental 
validity over and above more established constructs such as cognitive ability and personality 
have been the focus of debate and research. 
 So, are there conceptual differences between the three constructs? According to 
Landy (2005), emotional intelligence as a so-called new construct has simply replaced the 
older notion of social intelligence. Similarly, Bowman et al. (2001) posited that “it is not 
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certain to what extent tacit knowledge, social, and EQ measures are structurally 
independent.” (p. 148). Although our review shows that these three constructs have overlap, 
it is possible to make at least some subtle distinctions. On the one hand emotional intelligence 
might be somewhat narrower than social intelligence because it focuses on emotional 
problems embedded in social problems (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). That is probably why 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) defined emotional intelligence as a subset of social intelligence (p. 
189). Conversely, one might also posit that emotional intelligence is broader than social 
intelligence because internal regulatory processes/emotions are also taken into account, 
something which is not the case in social intelligence. Despite these differences, some 
authors have grouped social and emotional intelligence under the umbrella term of social and 
emotional effectiveness constructs (Heggestad & Morrison, 2008; Schlegel, Grandjean, & 
Scherer, 2013). Clearly, practical intelligence with its emphasis on real-world problems is 
more distinct than the other two constructs as it makes no reference to interpersonal skills 
(Austin & Saklofske 2005). Domain specificity is another aspect of tacit knowledge which 
contrasts to the more generic nature of social and emotional intelligence. In any case, these 
conceptual distinctions are open to investigation because few studies have explicitly 
examined the three constructs together (Weis & Süss, 2005). 
Insert Table 15.1 about here 
Measurement Approaches 
 In the previous section, we showed that the conceptual debate around practical, social, 
and emotional intelligence shared many parallels. The same can be said about their 
measurement because the similarities in how practical intelligence, social intelligence, and 
emotional intelligence are measured are striking. Generally, at least1 six measurement 
approaches might be distinguished: (1) self-reports, (2) other-reports, (3) interviews, (4) tests, 
                                            
1 Given space constraints we do not discuss physiological and neural measures (e.g., Raz, Dan, Arad, & Zysberg, 
2013). 
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(5) situational judgment tests, and (6) assessment center exercises. The following discusses 
each of these approaches including their advantages and disadvantages. Some examples of 
instruments are also given and these are summarized in Table 15.1 (see Côte, 2014, for a 
more comprehensive list of measures).  
Self-reports 
 The self-report approach presents respondents with descriptive statements and asks 
them to use a sort of rating scale to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with 
the respective statements. An important advantage of self-report measures is that they can be 
administered inexpensively and quickly to large groups of respondents. 
 Examples of the self-report approach are many. In fact, most examples of self-report 
emotional intelligence measures are based on the mixed model approach to emotional 
intelligence. Examples are the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI, Sala, 2002), the Trait 
Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS, Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995), EQ-I (Bar-
On, 1997), and the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue, Petrides & Furnham, 
2003). Other emotional intelligence measures are based on the four branch model (or its 
predecessors) (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) but use a self-report methodology (instead of 
performance-based tests) for measuring it. Some researchers have categorized these measures 
as a third stream within the emotional intelligence domain (apart from the ability and mixed 
models, e.g., Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; O’Boyle et al., 2011). Examples are the Wong Law 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS, Law et al., 2004; Wong & Law, 2002), the 
Multidimensional Emotional Intelligence Assessment (MEIA, Tett et al., 2005), the 
Swinburne University Emotional Intelligence Test (SUEIT, Palmer & Stough, 2001), or the 
Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT, Schutte et al., 1998). We refer to 
Pérez, Petrides, and Furnham (2005) for a comprehensive list of trait EQ measures. There 
exist also self-report inventories of social intelligence/social skills (e.g., Ferris et al., 2001; 
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Riggio, 1986; Schneider et al., 1996). We are not aware of self-report instruments (excluding 
SJTs as self-report measures) that assess tacit knowledge. 
 In the personality domain, there is a longstanding history of using self-report 
measures and an equally long debate over its use. Clearly, the debate and issues concerning 
the use of self-report measures in personality research (see Connelly & Ones, 2010) is 
generalizable to the use of self-report measures in assessing social and emotional intelligence. 
A detailed review of the pros and cons of self-report measures is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Suffice to say that self-report data are by no means perfect and it is in principle 
susceptible to various validity problems such as, lack of self-insight, and/or faking (e.g., 
Christiansen, Janovics, & Siers, 2010; Lievens, Klehe, & Libbrecht, 2011; Tett et al., 2012), 
and inflation of correlations due to common method variance. However, it is noteworthy that 
the severity of many of the purported problems of self-report data may be overstated (for 
details, see Chan, 2009). 
Other-reports 
 Other-reports (or informant reports) have also been used for measuring emotional and 
social intelligence. One reason is that knowledgeable others might provide less lenient and 
more reliable measurement. Another reason is that multidimensional constructs such as 
emotional and social intelligence inherently have an important interpersonal component. 
Hence, it makes sense that in other-reports the same emotional and social intelligence scales 
as listed above are used, with others (peers, colleagues, teachers, parents, friends) now rating 
the focal person on descriptive statements. For example, the ECI of Goleman can also be 
completed by peers or supervisors. There also exist emotional intelligence measures that were 
specifically developed for use in team settings. For instance, Jordan, Ashkanasy, Hartel, and 
Hooper (2002) developed a specific work group emotional intelligence measure, namely the 
Workgroup Emotional Intelligence Profile. 
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 Although there exists a large amount of research supporting the use of peer ratings in 
the personality domain (e.g., Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Funder, 1987; Kenny, 1991), 
research with other-based emotional intelligence measures is slowly catching up. Van der 
Zee, Thijs, and Schakel (2002) confirmed that peer ratings of emotional intelligence were 
more reliable. However, they also found that these peer ratings suffered from leniency. Law 
et al. (2004) reported that peer-reports of a trait-based emotional intelligence measure had 
substantial incremental validity over self-reports of emotional intelligence and personality. 
So, it seems beneficial to use peers for mixed model emotional intelligence measures. So far, 
Elfenbein, Barsade, and Eisenkraft (2015) have conducted the largest examination of peer-
reports in the context of emotional intelligence. Interestingly, their data came from self- and 
other-reports in work place settings. They found evidence of inter-rater agreement among 
others’ ratings of the focal person and of self– other agreement. Three other key findings 
were that (1) others could distinguish relatively well among the different emotional 
intelligence branches, (2) the other ratings predicted interdependent task performance, even 
after controlling for likability, and (3) that these predictions were more accurate than those 
based on self-rated or ability emotional intelligence measures. 
Performance-based Tests 
 Whereas both self-reports and peer-reports are assumed to be measures of typical 
performance, performance-based tests are posited to measure maximal performance. The 
rationale behind these tests parallels the one behind cognitive ability tests as these tests 
present people with social or emotion-based problem solving items. For example, in popular 
tests of emotion perception, individuals are presented with faces, voices or pictures and are 
then asked to describe the associated emotions.  
 Historically, performance-based tests have been used for measuring social 
intelligence. An often-cited example are O’Sullivan and Guilford’s (1965) (O'Sullivan, 
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Guilford, & deMille, 1965) tests of Social Intelligence (see Landy, 2006 for other older 
examples). A more modern example is the Levels of Emotional Awareness scale (LEAS, 
Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990), although this test has also been used as a 
measure of emotional intelligence (e.g., Barchard, 2003). Similarly, the Interpersonal 
Perception Task-15 (IPT-15, Costanzo & Archer, 1993) is a performance-based measure that 
presents videotapes to participants. 
 These tests have known a renaissance in the context of the ability model of emotional 
intelligence, with the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) as the 
best-known example. Other well-known examples are the Japanese and Caucasian Brief 
Affect Recognition Test (JACBART; Matsumoto et al., 2000), the Diagnostic Analysis of 
Nonverbal Accuracy (DANVA2, Nowicki, 2004), the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity 
(PONS; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979), the Emotional Accuracy Scale 
(EARS, Mayer & Geher, 1996), The Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE, 
Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 2000), and the Index of Vocal Emotion Recognition (Vocal-I; 
Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001).  
 As noted by Spector and Johnson (2006), there is a difference between knowledge 
about emotions and the actual skill. It is not because one knows how to regulate one’s 
emotion in the face of problems that one will also do this in an actual context. With regard to 
practical intelligence, this problem has been circumvented by using basic skills tests (Diehl, 
Willis, & Schaie, 1995). These tests measure among others the ability to perform daily tasks 
such as cooking or using a bus schedule. Scoring constitutes another problem of 
performance-based tests. In contrast to cognitive ability tests, emotional intelligence tests 
using the ability model, for instance, do not have objectively correct answers (with the 
exception of emotion perception tests constructed through digitally morphing faces). 
Interviews 
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 Interviews constitute another possible method for measuring practical, social, and 
emotional intelligence. In the past, especially social skills (social intelligence) have been 
frequently measured in interviews. This is demonstrated by the meta-analysis of Huffcutt, 
Conway, Roth, and Stone (2001) who reviewed the type of constructs most frequently 
targeted by interviews in 47 studies. Specifically, social skills were measured in 27.8 percent 
of the interviews. Moreover, applied skills were twice as frequently rated in high structure 
interviews (behavior description interviews and situational interviews) as compared to low 
structure interviews (34.1% vs. 17.7%). 
 Essentially, interviews are measurement methods that can be used to assess a wide 
variety of constructs. On the basis of multiple job-related questions interviewees are asked to 
describe behavior that is relevant for constructs deemed important. Therefore, interviews 
could also be used for measuring practical intelligence (Fox & Spector, 2000) and emotional 
intelligence (mixed model, Schmit, 2006). Schmit notes how interview questions can try to 
elicit situations from interviewees wherein they had to recognize emotions of others and how 
they dealt with this. Yet, in interviews observable samples of behavior can be observed only 
for specific dimensions (e.g., interpersonal skills or oral communication skills, Van 
Iddekinge, Raymark, & Roth, 2005). For other dimensions, candidates report past behavior 
(in behavior description interviews) or intended behavior (in situational interviews). 
Situational judgment tests 
 SJTs might be another approach for measuring practical, social, and emotional 
intelligence (Chan, 2000, 2006; O’Sullivan, 2007; Schulze, Wilhelm, & Kyllonen, 2007). 
SJTs are measurement methods that present respondents with job-related situations and sets 
of alternate courses of action to these situations. Per situation, respondents either select the 
best and worst options or rank/ rate each of the alternative actions in terms of its 
effectiveness. Meta-analytic research in employment settings documented the predictive and 
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incremental validity of SJTs in predicting job performance over and above cognitive ability 
scores and personality ratings (Chan & Schmitt, 2002; McDaniel et al., 2001; McDaniel, 
Hartman, Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007). 
 As respondents have to respond to realistic (written and especially video-based) 
scenarios SJTs might constitute a more contextualized (ecologically valid) way of measuring 
practical, social, and emotional intelligence. This judgment in a realistic context contrasts to 
the decontextualized nature of standardized tests. Technological advancements make it 
possible to develop interactive SJTs (aka branched SJTs) that present different video 
fragments contingent upon responses to earlier video fragments. This allows the SJT to 
simulate the dynamics of interaction. Similar to emotional intelligence tests (ability model), 
multiple-choice SJTs are scored using algorithms based on experts (excellent employees) or 
scored empirically based on the responses of large pilot samples. 
 Over the years, SJTs have been developed for measuring each of the three constructs. 
First, as noted by McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, and Braverman (2001), the first 
SJTs were social intelligence tests, namely the ‘Judgment in Social Situations’ subtest of the 
‘George Washington Social Intelligence Test.’ Second, instruments very similar to SJTs are 
used under the label “tacit knowledge tests” for measuring practical intelligence (Sternberg et 
al., 1995). Examples are the Tacit-Knowledge Inventory for Managers or the Tacit-
Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders. Third, research has explored the use of SJTs for 
measuring two branches of Mayer and Salovey’s emotional intelligence model. Specifically, 
MacCann, and Roberts (2007) developed the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding 
(STEU) and the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM). Whereas these prior SJTs 
relied on a paper-and-pencil format, some EI branches (e.g., emotion management) might be 
better measured via multimedia items (see Lievens & Sackett, 2016, for similar arguments 
about assessing interpersonal skills). Recently, MacCann, Lievens, Libbrecht, and Roberts (in 
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press) therefore developed a multimedia SJT for reliably and validly measuring emotional 
management (aka MEMA). As compared to the MSCEIT’s written emotional management 
test, they showed that scores on the MEMA tapped not only into cognitive ability but also 
into emotion perception. In the future, virtual and avatar-based environments might also be 
designed for measuring emotional intelligence facets. 
Assessment Center Exercises 
 Whereas SJTs are low-fidelity simulations that require candidates to pick the ‘correct’ 
answer from a limited set of predetermined response options instead of asking them to 
actually show how they would handle a specific situation, a final possible approach for 
measuring practical, social, and interpersonal intelligence consists of putting people in a 
simulated situation, observing their actual behavior, and then making inferences about their 
standing on the construct of interest. Performance (or authentic) assessment is often used as a 
general term for describing this strategy. In industrial and organizational psychology, this 
contextualized approach focusing on actual behavior is exemplified by assessment centers 
(ACs). In ACs, several job-related simulations (e.g., role-play, interview simulation, in-
basket, group discussion) aim to elicit behavior relevant to the constructs under investigation. 
The assumption is that individuals’ responses to these simulations reflect the responses that 
they would exhibit in the real world. Multiple trained assessors observe and rate the 
candidates on these constructs. 
 According to Gowing (2001), the roots of the measurement of social, practical, and 
emotional intelligence can be traced to this AC approach. Although these constructs are not 
explicitly measured in AC exercises, they correspond well to the typically competencies 
targeted by AC exercises. In particular, some AC competencies such as flexibility, awareness 
for others, interpersonal skills, flexibility, stress tolerance, and communication have clear 
resemblances with practical, emotional, and social intelligence. The context sensitivity of 
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what constitutes good performance in AC exercises and the ease with which situations may 
temporally unfold or change through injecting novel demands as the exercise progresses are 
features of the AC that makes it a useful method for measuring the adaptability competencies 
associated with practical, emotional, and social intelligence (Chan, 2000). 
Several researchers have explicitly related the measurement of these AC dimensions 
to the measurement of one or more of the three intelligence constructs. Specifically, Spector 
and Johnson (2006) presented various examples of how AC exercises might be adapted for 
measuring emotional intelligence. For example, in a role-play a participant might be asked to 
deal with an irate customer or to comfort an upset colleague. Assessors might then rate the 
assessees on broad-based competencies or on more detailed verbal/nonverbal behaviors. 
Another example is Stricker and Rock’s (1990) Interpersonal Competency Inventory (ICI) 
wherein participants have to respond orally to videotaped scenes (for a more recent example 
with webcam-captured performances, see Lievens, De Corte, & Westerveld, 2015). Similarly, 
Sternberg and colleagues have argued that the typical AC exercises are very useful for 
assessing practical intelligence. For example, Hedlund, Wilt, Nebel, Ashford, and Sternberg 
(2006) developed so-called “case scenario problems” as a skill-based measure of practical 
intelligence. These case scenario problems consist of a fictitious business case wherein 
participants are given information such as the history of the organization, their role, memos, 
emails, and financial tables. Individuals have to use their practical intelligence (practical 
problem-solving skills) to solve these contextual and poorly defined problems. Clearly, this 
methodology is somewhat similar to the case analysis and in-basket formats that have been 
used for decades in ACs.  
 Although the emphasis on simulations and actual behavior results in good AC 
validities (Arthur, Day, McNelly, & Edens, 2003) and little adverse impact (Terpstra, 
Mohamed, & Kethley, 1999), scores are often situation specific (Lance, Lambert, Gewin, 
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Lievens, & Conway, 2004). That is, ratings of the same competency do not converge well 
across exercises. In addition, there is little distinction between dimensions within a specific 
exercise as within-exercise dimension ratings are highly correlated. Although these findings 
were traditionally interpreted as indicative of poor convergent and discriminant validity 
evidence for AC ratings, this has changed now. As reviewed by Lance (2008), the situation 
specificity of AC results is regarded as reflecting true cross-situational variability of 
candidates across exercises. 
Combinations 
 Although we discussed the measurement approaches in separate sections, it is also 
possible to adopt combinations of them. For instance, MacCann, Wang, Matthews, and 
Roberts (2010) used an SJT for assessing emotion management with not only self-reports but 
also via an other-report format. So, they also asked a significant other what the focal person 
would do in a given situation. The correlation between self and other SJT scores was low 
(.19). Although the other-report SJT scores predicted the criteria as well as the typical self-
report SJT scores, the construct validity of the two measures was different. That is, SJTs 
scores on the basis of other-reports had lower means, higher Extraversion correlations, lower 
Agreeableness correlations, and lower correlations with g.  
Conclusions 
 Our review of measurement approaches suggests parallels in how the three constructs 
are measured. Although it is often thought that the three constructs are primarily measured 
with self-reports and performance tests, this section highlighted that there is a wide array of 
other options possible. Specifically, interviews, peer-reports, and instruments with somewhat 
more fidelity such as SJTs and AC exercises are viable measurement approaches. Future 
research should further explore differences and communalities between these alternative 
measurement methods. 
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Conceptual Framework for Examining Practical, Emotional, and Social Intelligence 
 In Figure 15.1, we present a conceptual framework that we adapted from Chan and 
Schmitt (2005) to organize the discussion and guide future research on the validity of 
practical, emotional, and social intelligence. Following Chan and Schmitt, the framework 
construes all three types of intelligence as competencies that are multidimensional constructs 
each of which is a partial mediator of the predictive or causal effect of unidimensional 
KSAOs on job performance or other job-relevant criteria. In addition, our framework 
construes the three types of intelligences as distinct but related competencies with both 
common and unique construct space as depicted by the three overlapping circles representing 
practical, emotional, and social intelligence. 
Insert Figure 15.1 about here 
 The framework in Figure 15.1 shows that both proponents and opponents of each of 
these three constructs are right and wrong in different ways. Specifically, the opponents 
typically focus on the KSAOs and correctly argue that practical, emotional and social 
intelligences are not factorially pure (unitary) KSAOs, but they incorrectly dismissed the 
validities and value of these intelligence constructs. Conversely, the proponents typically 
focus on the multidimensional competencies and correctly argue that practical, emotional, 
and social intelligences are proximal (and hence sometimes better) predictors of performance 
and other criteria, but they incorrectly ignored the important role of KSAOs in determining 
the nature of these intelligence constructs. 
 Our framework is consistent with and may reconcile several findings and the debate 
over the value of the three types of intelligence. For example, each of the three intelligence 
constructs is inherently multidimensional in the sense that it is conceptualized as a 
multidimensional competency resulting from a combination of several different individual 
difference constructs. The relationships linking each type of intelligence and the various 
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individual difference constructs explain the consistent findings from factor analytic studies 
that the intelligence measure is factorially complex and the data from the measure do not 
produce good fit with a single factor model. These relationships also explain the significant 
and sometimes substantial correlations between the intelligence measure and the established 
measures of traditional KSAOs such as cognitive ability and personality traits. In addition, 
these relationships provide the conceptual bases for examining ability models, trait models, 
and mixed models of emotional (as well as practical or social) intelligence.  
 The findings on the substantial zero-order validities and incremental validities of 
practical intelligence in predicting job performance over the prediction provided by cognitive 
ability and personality traits (e.g., Chan & Schmitt, 2002) are consistent with the proximal 
status of practical intelligence competencies (relative to the distal status of KSAOs) in the 
prediction of job performance. Similarly, the proximal status of emotional and social 
intelligence also explains the findings from studies that showed zero-order and incremental 
validities of these intelligence measures in the prediction of job performance and other 
criteria (for meta-analytic review of studies, see Druskat & Jordan, 2007). Interestingly, 
Figure 15.1 may also explain why SJTs and ACs, which are multidimensional measures, do 
better than factorially pure measures of single unitary constructs (e.g., cognitive ability, 
personality) in predicting job-relevant performance criteria which are often multidimensional 
in nature. That is, much of what SJTs and ACs are assessing may well be multidimensional 
competencies, similar, if not identical, to practical, emotional, and social intelligence. 
We believe the conceptual framework in Figure 15.1 is consistent with existing 
findings and reconciles much of the debate on the validity of practical, emotional, and social 
intelligence, but more direct empirical support of the framework is certainly needed. We 
reiterate the call in Chan and Schmitt (2005) that to obtain more direct evidence for a 
framework that construes the intelligence competencies as multidimensional mediators in the 
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relationship between KSAOs and job performance (and other criteria), we would need to 
specify and test hypothesized and alternative structural equation models (based on primary 
data from a single study or an accumulation of results from past studies using meta-analyses) 
linking KSAOs, intelligence competencies, and job performance or other criterion outcomes. 
Future research could derive theory-driven specific models from the general framework 
depicted in Figure 15.1 to empirically examine the validity of one or more of the three 
intelligence constructs that would facilitate the interpretation of the correlations between the 
intelligence construct and more established individual difference KSAOs as well as the zero-
order and incremental validities of the intelligence construct in predicting different criterion 
outcomes. The recent meta-analysis of Joseph et al. (2015) constitutes a good example of 
applying a similar framework for illuminating the construct saturation and validity of mixed 
model emotional intelligence measures. In the following section, we suggest various 
strategies for formulating theory-driven testable models that are likely to advance research in 
ways that make conceptual and practical contributions to the study of these constructs. 
Strategies for Future Research 
 We suggest the following strategies for future research on practical, social, and 
emotional intelligence: (1) developing better measures, (2) matching predictor and criterion, 
(3) disentangling methods and constructs, (4) going beyond bivariate relationships, (5) using 
longitudinal validation designs, and (6) adopting a multilevel perspective. 
Developing Better Measures  
When reviewing the domain of emotional intelligence, Miners, Côte, and Lievens 
(2016) counted that in one year alone more than 50 different measures were used for 
ostensibly assessing emotional intelligence. In addition, research typically shows that 
convergent validity among the scores on these different measures is hard to establish because 
the scores do not substantially correlate with each other. In line with Miners et al. (2016), we 
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therefore call researchers to pay much more attention to the underlying theoretical processes 
that intervene between the construct of emotional intelligence and responses to the emotional 
intelligence items that together constitute an emotional intelligence measure. This admonition 
is derived from a seminal paper by Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Van Heerden (2004) that 
posited that to assess the validity of measures, it is pivotal to relate variation in a construct 
with variation on the responses of the items as a precursor to the traditional content-related, 
construct-related, and criterion-related validation process.  
To stimulate further research Miners et al. (2016) outlined three specific strategies 
that researchers can adopt. They also exemplified how researchers can put these strategies 
into action in the context of the emotion perception branch. However, these strategies should 
also be applicable to other branches and for new emotional intelligence abilities (see Côté & 
Hildeg, 2011). Although this call for better emotional intelligence measurement is 
longstanding (e.g., Riggio, 2010, Ybarra, Kross, & Sanchez-Burks, 2014), we highlight it 
again here as a key area for future research. 
Matching between Predictor and Criterion 
An important development in personnel selection research is the movement away 
from general discussions of predictors as “valid” to consideration of “valid for what?” This 
development of more nuanced questions about predictor-criterion relationships was spurred 
by the taxonomic work on job performance led by Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, and Sager 
(1993) that differentiated performance into multiple distinct dimensions (Campbell, McCloy, 
Oppler, & Sager, 1993). Since then, selection researchers have significantly expanded the 
notion of job performance to include distinct performance dimensions such as those listed in 
the criterion space of the framework in Figure 15.1. The expansion of the definition of 
performance and recognition of the multidimensional nature of performance led to streams of 
research demonstrating that different predictor constructs and selection tests will offer 
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optimal predictive validity depending on the performance dimension(s) of interest (Chan, 
2005a). For example, research has shown that task performance is better predicted by 
cognitive ability tests, whereas contextual performance is better predicted by personality tests 
(McHenry, Hough, Toquam, Hanson, & Ashworth, 1990). The key message here is that one 
needs to carefully attend to the constructs underlying both predictors and criterion dimensions 
in developing hypotheses about predictor-criterion relationships. 
 Research on practical, social, and emotional intelligence has only begun linking these 
constructs to relevant criterion variables (Cherniss, 2010; Landy, 2005). These three 
constructs are often proposed to predict almost everything. Probably, this is best exemplified 
by studies investigating the validity of emotional intelligence for predicting academic 
performance (e.g., Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006; Barchard, 2003; Jaeger, 2003; Newsome, 
Day, & Catano, 2000; Parker, Hogan, Eastabrook, Oke, & Wood, 2006). There is little 
theoretical basis or conceptual match between emotional intelligence and GPA. Clearly, 
emotional intelligence will have at best moderate predictive value for predicting an omnibus 
cognitively-loaded criterion such as GPA. Hence, we need studies that carefully match the 
three intelligence constructs and their subdimensions to relevant criteria. For example, 
Libbrecht, Lievens, Carette, and Côte (2013) discovered that emotional intelligence was a 
good predictor of grades in courses that require interpersonal skills but not of overall GPA. 
Importantly, on a wider meta-analytical level, there is now also support for the predictor-
criterion matching logic because Joseph and Newman (2010) found that the validity of 
emotional intelligence measures for predicting job performance was higher in jobs high on 
emotional labor than for jobs low on emotional labor. 
 Referring to Figure 15.1, we could apply the conceptual matching between predictor 
and criterion to foster our understanding of the link between the three intelligence constructs 
and the difference dimensions of job performance. For instance, task performance might be 
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predicted by ability-based emotional intelligence, whereas contextual performance might be 
predicted by trait-based emotional intelligence. As another example, practical intelligence 
might predict adaptive performance better than it predicts routine task performance.  
Disentangling Methods and Constructs 
 In the field of I/O psychology, there is increased recognition that methods should be 
distinguished from constructs in the comparative evaluation of predictors (Arthur & Villado, 
in press; Arthur et al., 2003; Bobko, Roth, & Potosky, 1999; Chan & Schmitt, 1997, 2005; 
Lievens, Harris, Van Keer, & Bisqueret, 2003). Constructs refer to the substantive conceptual 
variables (e.g., conscientiousness, cognitive ability, finger dexterity, field dependence-
independence, reaction time, visual attention, emotional intelligence) that the measures were 
designed to assess. Conversely, methods refer to the tests, techniques or procedures (e.g., 
paper-and-pencil tests, computer-administered tests, video-based tests, interviews, and ACs, 
self-reports, peer reports) used to assess the intended constructs. This distinction between 
constructs and methods is especially crucial for multidimensional predictors (Bobko et al., 
1999). Conceptual and methodological issues of variance partition associated with the 
construct- method distinction and their applications to constructs such as practical 
intelligence are available in Chan and Schmitt (2005). 
 Given the multidimensional nature of practical, social, and emotional intelligence, 
clarity of the method-construct distinction is critical. As shown in Table 15.1, practical, 
social, and emotional intelligence might be measured in multiple ways. As noted above, 
social intelligence research has adopted such multitrait-multimethod design and cleared some 
of the confusion around this construct. For example, social intelligence constructs (e.g., social 
understanding, memory, and knowledge) were operationalized in a multitrait-multimethod 
design applying verbal, pictorial, and video-based performance measures. 
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 A similar strategy could be followed for clarifying some of the confusion related to 
emotional intelligence. So far, research mainly compared self-reports of ability-based 
emotional intelligence or mixed model emotional intelligence to personality inventories (see 
Roberts et al., 2006, for an exception). However, many more strategies are possible. One 
possibility is to operationalize a specific branch of the emotional intelligence ability model 
via different measurement approaches (Wilhelm, 2005). For example, the emotion 
understanding branch of the ability model might be measured via the MSCEIT and an SJT. 
Similarly, the emotion perception branch might be measured via faces, pictures, movies, 
voices, etc. As another example, people might complete an ability emotional intelligence test, 
they might provide self-reports of their emotional intelligence, and they might be rated by 
trained assessors on emotional intelligence (or conceptually similar competencies such as 
interpersonal sensitivity) in AC exercises. Such research designs (see also Landy, 2006) focus 
on convergent validity and enable to answer key questions as: How well do these different 
methods converge in assessing emotional intelligence? How much variance is accounted for 
by method factors and how much variance is accounted for by substantive construct factors?  
 It is important to distinguish between methods and constructs because comparative 
evaluations of predictors might be meaningful only when one either (1) holds the method 
constant and varies the content, or (2) holds the constructs constant and varies the method. 
This is another reason why it is crucial to operationalize emotional intelligence constructs via 
multiple methods. Moreover, it shifts the attention from measures to constructs (Matthews et 
al., 2004). Similarly, the need to include diversity in measurement also applies to the criterion 
side (see also Figure 15.1) because most studies on trait emotional intelligence are prone to 
common method variance (both predictors and criteria are measured with the same method, 
namely self-reports). We need studies that link the three intelligence constructs to objective 
measures of the various performance constructs.  
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Going Beyond Bivariate Relationships 
 In the broader field of personnel selection, researchers have gone beyond 
documenting simple bivariate relationships between individual difference predictor and job 
performance criterion to examine mediator and moderator relationships. Identifying 
mediators in the predictor-criterion relationship increases our understanding of the prediction 
and helps in the search for alternative predictors or design of interventions that influence 
individuals’ scores on the criteria (by understanding what might affect the mediator). 
Similarly, research could attempt to explicate the precise affective, cognitive, motivational, 
and behavioral mechanisms that mediate the effects of practical, emotional, or social 
intelligence on the criterion, and directly measure and test these hypothesized mediation 
mechanisms. For example, cognitions and motivations (expectancy and instrumentality 
beliefs), or more subtle mediators (likeability) may mediate the intelligence effects on criteria 
such as job satisfaction and performance. For instance, to clarify the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and GPA, MacCann, Fogarty, Zeidner, and Roberts (2011) found that 
emotional intelligence predicted achievement in school. That is, students higher on emotional 
intelligence used more effective strategies for coping with school-based stressors so that their 
achievement was less impeded by stress. 
 When an intelligence construct interacts with another predictor (e.g., personality trait) 
to affect the criterion, the interaction effect is mathematically equivalent whether we select 
intelligence or the other predictor as the moderator. However, conceptually, which predictor 
is selected as the moderator reflects different research questions. Identifying moderators that 
affect the magnitude and even nature of the relationship between the intelligence and 
criterion constructs is important as the moderator effect clarifies the range and boundary 
conditions of the predictive validity of the intelligence construct. There has been increasing 
research examining moderator effects in the predictive validity of personality traits (e.g., 
Practical, Emotional, and Social Intelligence 31 
Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005). In the domain of practical, emotional, and social 
intelligence, similar research on moderator effects has been conducted. For instance, Côté 
and Miners (2006) found that emotional intelligence was linked to task performance and 
OCB toward the organization only for people low on cognitive ability. Another example is 
Ferris et al. (2001) who reported that the relationship between social intelligence and job 
performance was stronger among workers high than low in cognitive ability. On the other 
hand, when the intelligence construct is the moderator affecting the relationship between 
another predictor and the criterion, the importance of the intelligence construct is 
demonstrated not in terms of its bivariate predictive validity of the criterion but in terms of its 
role in determining the range and boundary conditions of the bivariate predictive validity of 
another predictor. Several studies have demonstrated important moderator roles of practical, 
emotional, and social intelligence constructs. For example, Witt and Ferris (2003) found that 
the conscientiousness-performance relationship is moderated by social intelligence in that 
high levels of Conscientiousness together with poor social intelligence lead to lower 
performance. Chan (2006) found that proactive personality predicts work perceptions 
(procedural justice perception, perceived supervisor support, social integration) and work 
outcomes (job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment, job performance) positively 
among individuals with high practical intelligence (construed in terms of situational judgment 
effectiveness) but negatively among those with low practical intelligence. The findings on the 
disordinal interaction effects show that high levels of proactive personality may be either 
adaptive or maladaptive depending on the individual’s level of practical intelligence and 
caution against direct interpretations of bivariate associations between proactive personality 
and work-relevant criteria. To encourage researchers to go beyond bivariate relationships, 
Côte (2014) presents various strategies that could be followed. 
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 In short, fruitful future research could be conducted by adopting a strategy that goes 
beyond bivariate relationships to examine the mediators that link the intelligence construct to 
the criterion construct, the moderators that affect the nature of the intelligence-criterion 
relationship, and the role of the intelligence construct as a moderator affecting the nature of a 
predictor-criterion relationship. 
Using Longitudinal Validation Designs 
 The time spans over which criteria are gathered for validation studies often reflect 
practical considerations. In predictive studies, the time period selected for the criterion rarely 
exceeds a year or two. Validation studies of practical intelligence, social intelligence or 
emotional intelligence are no exception. As such, criterion-related validities reported for 
these three constructs may or may not accurately estimate the long-term validities associated 
with these constructs. That is, early performance may not be reflective of typical performance 
over an individual’s tenure in an organizational or educational context, and if so, early 
validation efforts would provide misleading results. 
 In the personnel selection domain, research has shown that predictors of job 
performance might differ across job stages. Along these lines, the transitional job stage where 
there is a need to learn new things is typically contrasted to the more routine maintenance job 
stage (Murphy, 1989). For instance, Thoresen, Bradley, Bliese, and Thoresen (2004) found 
that Openness was related to performance and performance trends in the transition stage but 
not to performance at the maintenance stage.  
 We believe that future studies on practical, social, and emotional intelligence should 
also adopt a longitudinal design where possible. Similar to personality, it might well be that 
the validity of these intelligence constructs differs in the long run for predicting job 
performance. For example, the transitional job stage typically involves more adaptive 
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demands than the routine maintenance job stage. So, practical intelligence might predict job 
performance stronger in the transitional job stage than in the routine maintenance job stage. 
 A construct-oriented approach to the study of practical, emotional, and social 
intelligence that locates the constructs in the framework presented in Figure 15.1 would 
provide the conceptual basis to hypothesize, test, and interpret performance changes over 
time. Using appropriate longitudinal designs and change assessment techniques allows to 
draw practical implications for key issues such as changes in test validities, changes in mean 
performance, changes in rank order of individuals’ performance, and changes in 
dimensionality (i.e., number/ nature of dimensions) of performance (Chan, 1998a, 2005a). 
Adopting a Multilevel Perspective 
In many contexts, personnel selection researchers have started to move beyond the 
individual level to consider variables at the higher levels (e.g., group, organization) of 
analysis. In the conceptual framework presented in Figure 15.1, the three intelligence 
constructs, as well as all the other constructs in the individual difference and criterion spaces 
could be conceptualized, measured, and analyzed in multiple levels of analysis (e.g., 
individual, group, organization). 
So far, the research on practical, emotional, and social intelligence has not adopted a 
multilevel approach. With the increasing reliance on the use of teams to accomplish work in 
various organizations, the relevant job performance criteria are often at the higher level (e.g., 
team, organization) than the individual level of analysis (for an example in the field of 
personality, see Oh, Kim, & Van Iddekinge, 2015). When each of the three intelligence 
constructs is examined as predictors in the multilevel context of staffing teams or 
organizations and relating them to job performance at the individual, team, and organizational 
levels, we would need appropriate composition models (Chan, 1998b) that explicate the 
functional relationships linking the same intelligence constructs at the different levels of 
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analysis so that we have clear conceptual understanding of what is meant by say team social 
intelligence and how to measure and analyze social intelligence at the team level. The 
multidimensional nature of the practical, emotional, and social intelligence constructs poses 
challenges to multilevel research because of the increased difficulty in formulating and 
testing appropriate composition models for these intelligence constructs. 
Multilevel constructs and data bring with them complex conceptual, measurement, 
and data analysis issues and discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter (for 
review, see Chan, 1998b, 2005b). Our basic point is that a multilevel approach is a strategy 
for future research on practical, emotional, and social intelligence that is not just desirable but 
probably necessary, given the inherently multilevel nature of the criteria of interest (e.g., 
team performance) that are emerging in personnel selection research. 
Epilogue 
 We have, under the constraint of a relatively short chapter length, critically reviewed 
the vast literature on practical, emotional, and social intelligence constructs. We have 
proposed a conceptual framework, adapted from Chan and Schmitt (2005), that provides a 
way to organize the conceptualizations of the intelligence constructs and their relationships 
with other individual difference and criterion constructs. We believe that this framework also 
reconciles some if not most of the findings and debates in the literature on the intelligence 
constructs. Finally, by explicating several strategies for future research, we hope that more 
scientifically rigorous studies could be conducted on practical, emotional, and social 
intelligence to provide practitioners in personnel selection and other HR functions with a 
more evidence-based basis for the use of these intelligence constructs and measures. 
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Table 15.1.  
Overview of Methods (Including Some Examples) for Measuring Practical, Emotional, and 
Social Intelligence 
 Ability Emotional 
Intelligence Model 
Trait Emotional 
Intelligence Model 
Practical 
Intelligence 
Social 
Intelligence 
Self- 
reports 
§ WLEIS 
§ SREIT 
§ MEIA 
§ SUEIT 
§ EQ-I 
§ ECI 
§ TMMS 
§ TEIQue 
§ AES 
§ Self-reports 
of people’s 
behavior in 
everyday 
situations 
§ Social skills 
inventories 
§ TSIQue 
Other-reports § Same as self-
reports 
§ Workgroup 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
Profile  
§ Same as self-reports § Other-
reports of 
people’s 
behavior in 
everyday 
situations 
§ Same as self-
reports 
Performance-
based Tests 
§ MSCEIT 
§ DANVA2 
§ PONS 
§ JACBART 
§ EARS 
§ VOCAL-I 
§ MSFDE 
§ MERT 
§ No known examples § Basic Skills 
Tests 
§ LEAS 
§ IPT-15 
§ Four/ Six 
Factor Tests of 
Social 
Intelligence 
§ MTSI 
Interviews § Interview rating 
on components of 
the four branch 
model of Mayer, 
Salovey, and 
Caruso. 
§ Interview rating on 
mixed model 
emotional 
intelligence 
competencies 
(interpersonal 
sensitivity, stress 
tolerance, etc.) 
§ Interview 
rating on 
people’s 
reported 
behavior in 
everyday 
situations 
§ Interview 
rating on 
applied social 
skills 
Situational 
Judgment 
Tests (SJTs) 
§ STEU 
§ STEM 
§ TEMINT 
§ MEMA 
§ SJTs that aim to 
measure mixed 
model emotional 
intelligence 
competencies 
§ Tacit 
Knowledge 
Inventories 
§ George 
Washington 
Social 
Intelligence 
Test (Judgment 
in Social 
Situations) 
Assessment 
Centers 
(ACs) 
§ AC rating on 
components of the 
four branch model 
of Mayer, 
Salovey, and 
Caruso. 
 
§ AC rating on mixed 
model emotional 
intelligence 
competencies 
§ Case 
Situational 
Problems 
§ AC rating on 
applied social 
skills 
Note. Abbreviations are explained in the text. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 15.1. Conceptual Framework for Examining Practical, Emotional, and Social 
Intelligence (adapted from Chan & Schmitt, 2005) 
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